Abstract-Secure ZigBee wireless sensor and control networks use 128-bit AES encryption to defend against message sniffing and unauthorized access. However, the low cost and low complexity of ZigBee devices makes them vulnerable to physical attacks such as tampering and network key extraction. Network administrators and penetration testers require tools such as Zbfind to accurately locate ZigBee hardware and evaluate physical security. The open source Zbfind tool estimates distance to ZigBee devices in real time using received signal strength and a distance prediction model. We collect 4500 signal strength measurements along nine walking paths toward ZigBee transmitters in three office buildings. We find that the logdistance path loss model used by Zbfind predicts transmitter distance with 92.5% mean absolute percentage error. We construct an alternative linear model that reduces error to 21%.
INTRODUCTION
Low-Rate Personal Area Networks (LR-WPANs) are an increasingly popular option for energy-efficient, short-range wireless sensing and control networks. The IEEE 802.15.4 media access control (MAC) and physical layer (PHY) standards [1] provide an LR-WPAN foundation of open standards upon which network (NWK) and higher layer protocols rely. The ZigBee protocol stack is a leading example of NWK, interoperability, and security standards that rely on an IEEE 802.15.4 foundation [2] . LR-WPAN solutions are attractive for building and industrial automation [3] , security systems, health care monitoring, and smart energy [4] . Tens of millions of upgraded utility meters employ ZigBee Smart Energy standards for bidirectional communication as part of Advanced Metering Infrastructures (AMI) [5] . Novel LR-WPAN sensor and control applications are an active area of research [6] - [9] .
Secure ZigBee LR-WPANs protect confidentiality, message integrity, and authenticity via 128-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) keys. Security is paramount in wireless systems that handle personal information or are responsible for controlling physical devices. While the small size and low complexity of ZigBee devices makes them costeffective to deploy in large numbers, these traits also result in tight constraints on device memory and computation. Small, inexpensive wireless sensors are unlikely to have robust defenses against theft and tampering, resulting in physical vulnerabilities to network key confidentiality [10] .
Open source tools for locating and attacking LR-WPANs are under active development and are available for download over the Internet. The KillerBee framework [11] includes a comprehensive set of attack capabilities, including tools for finding networks (e.g. Zbfind), sniffing traffic, and packet injection. Api-do tools for security auditing [12] further extend KillerBee functionality to include simultaneous traffic sniffing on multiple channels. Once a penetration tester or attacker locates and establishes physical access to an LR-WPAN end device, additional open source tools assist with network key extraction, such as GoodFET hardware and software [13] . There is strong motivation to develop security-auditing tools for LR-WPANs to prevent wireless security missteps such as the infamous Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) standard [14] .
Our work experimentally evaluates KillerBee-supported hardware for locating ZigBee end devices. We report algorithm corrections that significantly improve Zbfind rangefinding to indoor ZigBee transmitters while exploring on foot ("warwalking").
II. BACKGROUND
Received radio frequency (RF) signal strength (RSS) declines with increasing distance from the transmitter. Network hardware quantifies RSS as the received signal strength indicator (RSSI), a unitless measure of signal power. This principle has long been used to approximate transmitter distance because it requires no additional measurements or infrastructure [15] . Recent works investigate and improve wireless network RSS-based ranging algorithms for security, tracking, and navigation applications [16] - [19] . The most accurate RSS-based positioning techniques rely upon a grid of static sensor nodes with well-known RSS characteristics [20] - [22] . However, an attacker interested in rapidly locating LR-WPAN devices does not have access to such extensive information. Instead, the attacker must solely rely upon realtime RSSI measurements taken from their vicinity while walking around the target environment. Data from [23] includes outdoor RSSI measurements at varying distances from four wireless sensor models. Alternatively, this paper focuses solely on improving distance estimation for warwalking indoors.
A basic and popular signal model with demonstrated success indoors is the log-distance path loss model [24] . Zbfind uses the log-distance path loss model (1) where d is the estimated distance to the transmitter in meters, P is the environmental path loss constant, A is the reference RF input power in dBm measured at d = 1 m, and r is the RF input power in dBm measured at an unknown distance from the transmitter. RSSI conversion to RF input power is hardware dependent; the initial release of KillerBee only supports the AT86RF230 transceiver [25] on an Atmel RZUSBstick [26] through custom firmware. Killerbee also supports TelosB hardware, which is larger and more expensive than the RZUSBstick. Support for additional hardware is in progress at the time of this writing, but not yet complete.
The AT86RF230 calculates RSSI from detected signal energy and stores it as a discrete value RSSI ∈ {0, 1, … , 28} in the least significant five bits of its PHY_RSSI register [25] . Zbfind converts RSSI to dBm by (2) for the computation of A and r in (1). A value of zero for represents RF input power less than -91 dBm. Reference RF input power A is set to -58 dBm and path lost constant P is set to 3 in the Zbfind version 1.0 source code. The value of A increases to -53 dBm in the Zbfind r33 update [27] , based on measurements from three different transmitters.
Default values for A and r in Zbfind are not optimized for indoor warwalking. Using (1) [14, 15 .33] on the RZUSBstick) for A [24] . More significantly, the Zbfind path loss constant (P = 3) is simply set to the mid-point of the recommended range [2, 4] for P noted in [23] . Given known hardware (RZUSBstick) and a specific task (warwalking in office buildings), Section III presents experimentally estimated best-fit values for A and r.
III. INDOOR MODEL PARAMETER ESTIMATION

A. Reference RSSI
Transmitter technical specifications are not likely to be available to an attacker, so the reference RSSI should be the expected value of RSSI at d = 1 m given a wide range of possible transmitters. A survey of all possible transmitter configurations is not feasible, but this section reports reference RSSI measurements collected from six 1 mW ZigBee transmitters, two each: AT86RF230, MC13224V, and CC2420.
The measurement configuration consists of a transmitter and receiver at a fixed d = 1 m distance apart, 0.8 m above the floor. Regardless of the antenna orientation of the transmitter, only RSSI measurements of 12, 13, or 14 occur. The RSSI Ref sample mean is 13.095±0.045 with 99% confidence (A = -51.715±0.135 dBm). Consistent with the hypothesis in Section II, our sample mean from six transmitters is significantly higher than both previous point estimates: RSSI Ref = 11 and 12.67 in Zbfind 1.0 and Zbfind r33, respectively. This revised estimate increases the maximum reportable distance by (1) to 20.4 m given P = 3. While an improvement, the value of P also requires correction to reflect real-world ZigBee indoor measurements. The transmitter with the smallest RSSI variance, an MC13224V, serves as the transmitter in all experiments in Subsection III-B.
B. Path Loss Constant
RSS attenuates due to obstructions between transmitter and receiver, including walls, furniture, and even free space. Receiver characteristics such as antenna orientation and height off the floor are also significant factors. Constant receiver orientation (vertical) and antenna height off the floor (0.8 m) remove the latter two confounding factors from our distance estimates. This height and orientation allows the RZUSBstick to potentially be concealed in a cane, walker, umbrella, etc. An attacker does not have knowledge of the other attenuating factors while searching for ZigBee devices, therefore trial measurements collected in similar environments are essential to approximate the path loss constant. This section describes RSSI measurements collected along warwalking approach paths to indoor ZigBee transmitters. Figure 2 plots the mean observed distance versus RSSI along the LoS paths, the non-LoS paths, all nine paths combined. The inherent variability in RSSI measurements is evident from the LoS results. Expectedly, mean distances per RSSI are measurably higher along LoS paths than along the obstructed paths. However, the relationship between RSSI and mean distance is largely consistent between the different types of path, suggesting that one model fitted to the combined path data is sufficient to estimate distance given LoS or obstructed scenarios. Given (1) with improved A = -51.7 dBm, the path lost constant best-fit value is P = 2.59.
IV. INDOOR MODEL ACCURACY COMPARISON
The experimental results appear to follow a linear trend for d ≥ 1 m, which are the distance estimates of most use to a warwalker. During experiments, the RZUSBstick exclusively reports RSSI ∈ The linear fit has an adjusted coefficient of determination of R 2 adj = 0.81. Figure 3 overlays the best-fit version of (1) where is the number of fitted points, is the measured value and is the fitted value. MAPE M = 44.6 % error for the best fit using (1) while M = 21.0 % error for (3) . This means that (3) predicts measured distance with more than twice the accuracy of (1). Additionally, MAPE improves from M = 181.5 % error using Zbfind 1.0 to M = 92.5 % error for Zbfind r33. These MAPE values reinforce and quantify relative model performance evident in Figure 3 .
Both (1) and (3) provide continuous estimates of distance even though individual RSSI values are discrete. The current implementation of Zbfind updates its distance estimation from the RSSI from every successive transmission. Since RSSI can be highly variable, this can lead to rapidly changing distance estimations that are confusing to interpret. A possible improvement may be to take the mean RSSI over the previous transmissions, providing a less variable distance estimate to the warwalker. The effectiveness of such modifications is a subject for future work that will require an accurate continuous range estimation model.
V. CONCLUSION
We show that the log-distance path loss model (1) used in the open source ZigBee device location tool Zbfind fits indoor distance and RSSI measurements with 44.6% error, even with the experimental best fit for path loss constant P. Results suggest that a linear model is twice as accurate at estimating distances greater than 1 m from the transmitter in an indoor office environment.
Upcoming work will assess the applicability of the RSSIbased rangefinding models presented here to other classes of indoor environment, such as hospitals. Warwalkers will then be able to select the best distance estimation model for particular target environments. Zbfind exclusively supports the RZUSBstick currently, although custom KillerBee firmware is also available for the TelosB platform. Additional experimentation will establish distance estimation models customized for TelosB hardware, expanding Zbfind accessibility.
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